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Abstract In this paper, we review three influential theories of imagination in
order to understand how the dynamics of imagination acts could be modeled
using formal languages. While reviewing them, we notice that they are not
detailed enough to account for all the mechanisms involved in creating and
developing imaginary worlds. We claim those theories could be further refined
into what we call the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, which defines a
framework that can be used to study the dynamics of imagination using formal
languages, and we support our claim by showing how the framework allows to
model certain imagination acts step by step. Then, we introduce the Rhombus
of Imagination, which is a visual tool that can be used in conjunction with our
framework to study the procedural structure of different kinds of imagination
acts and identify their dynamic properties.
Keywords Imagination · Dynamic imagination · Reality-oriented develop-
ment · Imaginary worlds · Formal models
1 Introduction and Motivations
Imagining is something we do everyday in our lives and in a wide variety of
ways. When planning our next move in a game of chess, when picturing how
we could decorate our new room, or even when listening to a story-teller, our
mind creates, develops and evaluates imaginary worlds aimed to guide our
actions, update our beliefs, or entertain us. Imagination has received a great
deal of attention by philosophers, cognitive scientists and psychologists, as
it can be seen in works like Walton (1990), Currie and Ravenscroft (2002),
Nichols (2006), or Kind (2016b). Its interest within the studies of the mind
is beyond any doubt, and its relation to other mechanisms, such as emotions,
(Author affiliations omitted for blind review)
2 (Author names omitted for blind review)
behavior, desires and beliefs, makes imagination particularly interesting in
many different areas.
There are many works in the literature that study the relation between
imagination and other mental attitudes, such as knowledge (as in Kind and
Kung (2016)), beliefs (in Sinhababu (2016)), desires (in Kind (2016a)), or
how imagination affects our decision-making abilities (in Nanay (2016)). Some
of these works also provide insights on how the mechanisms of creating and
developing new imaginary worlds work. The aim of the present work is neither
to study the outputs that result from an act of imagination, nor how acts of
imagination affects our actions, or other mental attitudes. Instead, this work
focuses on studying the dynamic processes involved in the act of creating and
elaborating the imaginary worlds that result from such acts. In particular, we
are interested in assessing how the existing theories behind the dynamics of
imagination could be used as the basis for formal systems, such as a formal
logic, or a computer simulation. Due to this, our main goal in this work will
be to draw bridges between the intuitions captured in the reviewed theories of
imagination and the main mechanics that could be represented using formal
languages.
Many authors distinguish between different mental attitudes related to
imagination. For instance, Funkhouser and Spaulding (2009) and Nichols and
Stich (2000) distinguish “imagination” and “pretense” by requiring “pretense”
to involve some behavior, or action. Other works like Balcerak-Jackson (2016)
draw a distinction between “imagine”, “suppose” and “conceive”, which are
seen as three different ways to refer to our ability to think about scenarios and
objects that may or may not exist.
In this work we are interested in studying the dynamic processes involved in
creating a so-called “imaginary world”. There are a few important clarifications
that should be kept in mind throughout the rest of the present paper, and
which will help understand both the way we use certain terms, and the overall
aim of our work:
1. When we talk about an “imaginary world”, or an “imaginary scenario”,
we refer to any mental representation of a state of affairs that is not actual
and, moreover, about which the relevant agent is aware of it not being
actual. Therefore, representations of state of affairs used in supposition,
or pretense, for instance, are also taken into account in our work, and we
refer to them as imaginary worlds as well. Other kinds of mental represen-
tations, such as false beliefs, would not be the target of our model. This is
because, in those cases, the agent is not aware of the fact that those mental
representations do not correspond to the actual state of affairs.
2. Our main goal lies in understanding how those imaginary worlds are cre-
ated and developed, but we do not consider, in our study, what happens
when such worlds have been created, why the agent is creating them, or
what outcomes follow from entertaining them1. Therefore, we do not re-
1 In relation to Van Leeuwen (2013), we can say that our interest lies in constructive
imagining.
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strict ourselves to any particular kind of imagination act, like supposition,
conception or pretense. As each and every one of these mental actions in-
volve creating and elaborating representations of state of affairs that are
not actual, we consider them all indistinctly. Therefore, we will be talking
about “imagination” in a broad sense that includes those more specific
kinds of imagination acts.
3. Furthermore, we focus on “voluntary” acts of imagination, which are those
acts that are started by the agent consciously choosing an initial premise to
characterize the imaginary scenario. As these are the kind of acts that are
mainly explored in the theories we will examine, our work will also focus
on them. Therefore, we will not consider involuntary imaginary scenarios
such as dreams, hallucinations, or simply imaginings that pop up into the
mind of the agent unexpectedly.
The content of the present paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
briefly review Langland-Hassan’s theory on Guiding Chosen imaginings, and
highlight how the processes described in it can be mapped to two other theories
strongly focused on the dynamics of imagination acts. In Section 3 we propose
a refined framework that allows to account for a more detailed distinction
regarding the dynamics of creating and developing imaginary worlds in formal
settings, and we provide an example of how the framework can be used. Then,
in Section 4 we introduce the Rhombus of Imagination and show how it can
capture the procedural structure of different kinds of imagination acts. Finally,
we summarize our main conclusions and point to some possible lines of future
work in Section 5.
2 The Dynamics of Imagination
In this section, we start by reviewing the mechanisms identified in Peter
Langland-Hassan’s theory for Guiding Chosen imaginings. The quasi-formal
treatment of Langland-Hassan’s work towards the processes of imagination
makes it a good starting point for our interest in drawing bridges between
the dynamics of imagination and formal systems. Further on, we briefly point
out how other previous works that focused on the dynamics of imagination
identify similar mechanisms, and we take them as a starting point to distill a
theory-independent, shared structure of dynamics processes.
2.1 Langland-Hassan’s Theory
In Langland-Hassan (2016), Peter Langland-Hassan studies how it is possible
that voluntary imagination acts initiated by our own intentions can be used to
improve our epistemic state. The author distinguishes between four kinds of
imaginings and focuses on Guiding Chosen (GC) imaginings, which are those
imaginings voluntarily initiated by the agent, and which can provide useful
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information regarding how a certain imaginary situation would be, if it was
real.
In order to understand GC imaginings, there are three features of their
architecture that need to be accounted for: the initial involvement of top-
down intentions that initiate an imagining, the use of lateral constraints in
the development of such imagining, and the cyclical involvement of top-down
intentions that are used to add new premises during the imagining.
When setting the initial content of an imagining, we use top-down in-
tentions (that is: voluntary, conscious actions of the agent regarding what
to imagine) that are indeed chosen. Langland-Hassan, then, focuses on how
imaginative episodes “advance” from one state to another. As he claims, if
only top-down intentions were used in the advancement of those episodes,
then learning something new via imaginings would be pretty difficult, as their
advancement would already be determined by our own will.
In order to overcome this problem, Langland-Hassan calls for a set of lateral
constraints which, after the conditions of the initial imagining have been set,
encode the set of norms, logic, or algorithms governing how the imaginative
episode would unfold. Langland-Hassan identifies a sequence of mental states
i1, . . . , in, which are altogether called an “imaginative episode”, and in which
each ix is called an “imaginative state”. Now, the author sees each of the
imaginative states ix in an imaginative episode as a result of an inference
step, given what is the case in the previous state ix−1, and following certain
rules determining how ix−1 leads to ix. In particular, his account describes the
unfolding of an imaginative scenario as a sort of step-by-step process guided
by implications; for example, given an imaginative state ix with content p and
a set of lateral constraints containing a norm of the form p → q, the next
imaginative state ix+1 would have content q.
Langland-Hassan refers to the “deviance” objection when taking into ac-
count how, even in cases of GC imagining, the way an imaginative episode
advances usually deviates from anything we would likely expect to happen,
given the initial conditions. While comparing his approach to Nichols and
Stich’s Script Elaborator (which we introduce in Section 2.2), the author notes
how, if those deviant additions are understood as new premises being volun-
tarily added by the agent, then the role of the Script Elaborator could be
reduced to a cyclical involvement of a new top-down intention that begins the
whole process anew. In other words, Langland-Hassan argues that there is no
need for a distinct mechanism devoted to this task. The new premises added
in this case, then, would be determined by a desire of the agent to intervene
in the imagining in a certain way.
The whole process of GC imaginings is represented in Fig. 1. The dotted
circle at the left hand of the figure represents that there is no imaginary
world yet; the dashed lines represent how certain processes of imagination
either create a new imaginary world, or update an already existing one with
new information. Note how this schema accounts for the fact that, whenever
the scenario deviates in a “non-scripted” way through a new desire-driven
addition, it is identified as being a new top-down intention. In particular, we

















Fig. 1: An act of imagination according to Langland-Hassan’s theory.
represent this by the fact that the state at the upper-right corner of the figure
is identified as ix and, through applying the lateral constraints, it unfolds a
next ix+1 (which, in the schema, points back to the same state to capture the
fact that those additions would “naturally” unfold in that state); however, and
in order to stress out that a new top-down intention with a new premise will
alter the imagining in atypical ways, the state at the lower-right corner of the
figure is identified by iy, instead of ix+n. Once the new imagining has been
set, though, lateral constraints compute the next iy+1 by following the norms,
rules and algorithms that describe how the imagining would typically unfold.
2.2 Nichols and Stich’s Cognitive Theory of Pretense
Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich present in Nichols and Stich (2000) a theory
of pretense2 that aims to identify which mechanisms, within our minds, are in-
volved in pretense episodes. The authors build their proposal upon an already
existing architecture of the mind, which includes different “boxes” that store
representation tokens accounting for beliefs and desires, as well as a set of
inference mechanisms. Within this already existing architecture, Nichols and
Stich introduce three further components needed to explain how our imagina-
tion works: the Possible World Box, a set of Inference Mechanisms and the
Script Elaborator.
The Possible World Box (PWB onwards) is structurally and functionally
very similar to the boxes containing belief and desire tokens. However, its main
difference with respect to those is that the PWB’s job is not to represent the
world as it is, nor as the agent wishes it to be, but rather to represent how
the world would be like, given a certain initial premise.
2 It is worth noting how, on page 127, the authors explain that, without taking action
into account, their theory of pretense can be understood as a theory of imagination, which
is in fact where our interest lies in this work.
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When the initial premise is added into the PWB, the cognitive system
starts filling up the PWB with a detailed description of how the world would
be like, if the pretense premise was true. This is handled by what they call
the Inference Mechanisms, which are responsible for determining, given the
initial premise and the agent’s beliefs, what else would be the case in the
imagined scenario. Those alternative developments of the initial imagining
are then dumped into the PWB, and a sub-mechanism called the UpDater
checks all the representations in the PWB, while deleting those that are not
compatible with the new premise that has just been added.
Aside from the way things could typically unfold, there are still many ways
in which a pretense episode could develop and which are neither specified by
the initial premise, nor by the pretender’s beliefs. Although the authors do not
provide a detailed account of its structure and the way it works, they claim that
there exists some mechanism (their emphasis) sub-serving this process, which
they call the Script Elaborator. As we mentioned in Section 2.1, Langland-
















Fig. 2: An act of imagination according to Nichols and Stich’s theory.
Fig. 2 represents how Nichols and Stich’s theory accounts for the way
imaginary scenarios are created and elaborated. A new scenario is initiated by
putting a pretense premise ϕ into the PWB, and then the scenario is filled
up with details taken from the agent’s beliefs, expressed as reality-oriented
facts and scripts. Then, the Script Elaborator may also come up with a new
pretense premise ψ, which is added into the scenario.
2.3 Williamson’s Modes of Imagination
Further similarities regarding the dynamics of imagination can be found in
Williamson (2016), where Timothy Williamson argues against the apparent
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opposition that exists between knowledge and imagination3, and that often
appears in the literature. According to this distinction, knowledge is related
to facts, whereas imagination is related to fiction. However, imagination can
be, when used properly, a powerful tool to acquire new knowledge. In order
to be used in such a way, imagination must be constrained by reality-oriented
rules and facts that make imaginary scenarios unfold the same way they would
do, if they were real. The author proposes a distinction between two different
modes in which imagination can work: voluntary and involuntary.
In voluntary mode, certain initial conditions that describe an imaginary
scenario are set. For instance, if someone wants to assess whether she would
be able to jump through a mountain stream, the imaginary scenario should be
initiated by including that mountain stream, plus any other detail that might
be relevant for the assessment of the person’s chance to jump over it.
Once these initial conditions have been set, imagination starts running
in involuntary mode and unfolds the consequences that would likely follow
from the initial scenario, if it was real. The epistemic value of these imaginary
exercises lies in the “if it was real” part: of course, one can choose to imagine
(almost) any outcome she wants, but it would be of little epistemic value if such









Fig. 3: An act of imagination according to Williamson’s theory.
Fig. 3 represents how acts of imagination work, according to Williamson.
Through an act of voluntary imagination with initial conditions ϕ, an imag-
inary world is created. Then, it is developed by the involuntary imagination,
which follows reality-oriented rules and facts. Note how, unlike in Fig. 1 and
Fig. 2, the schema for Williamson’s theory does not account for any kind of
atypical development of the imaginary world; this is in accordance with the
fact that, in his work, the author is only concerned with reality-oriented de-
velopment.
2.4 Distilling the Theories
Although the theories just reviewed have some differences, the analysis they
do of the mechanisms involved in creating and developing imaginary worlds
3 It is worth noting that, as argued in Spaulding (2016), Williamson uses the term “imag-
ination” in a broad sense, which includes supposition, the evaluation of conjunctive condi-
tionals, and so on.
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have a lot in common. The reviewed theories all focus on voluntary acts of
imagination. Every act of imagination characterized as such starts with a vol-
untary action of the agent that creates, or initiates, a new representation of
an alternative state of affairs. This action requires, as a parameter, a set of
initial premises, or conditions, that characterize the imaginary scenario that is
to be created. This process corresponds to Langland-Hassan’s initial top-down
intentions, to Nichols and Stich’s action of putting a premise into the PWB,
and to Williamson’s voluntary imagination.
Once the imaginary scenario has been created, it can be elaborated by
providing more details of what else could be the case in there, with respect
to the initial premises that have just been used to create it. The sources of
such development are, again according to all three theories, encoded into the
agent’s beliefs and knowledge about the real world in the form of rules or
scripts. We refer to this process as the reality-oriented development, and we
associate it with Langland-Hassan’s lateral constraints, Nichols and Stich’s
Inference Mechanisms, and Williamson’s involuntary imagination.
More often than not, imaginative episodes develop in highly unexpected
ways. Why does this happen, and where do these plot twists come from? The
agent wishes something unexpected to happen, and thus decides to stop fo-
cusing on what would typically be the case in that scenario, and starts feeding
new premises into the imaginary world. Only two of the three previous theo-
ries account for this action: as Williamson is only interested in reality-oriented
imagination, his work does not account for this phenomenon. Nevertheless,
both Langland-Hassan’s theory, through the cyclical involvement of top-down
intentions, as well as Nichols and Stich’s theory, through the Script Elaborator,
do take this into account.
Table 1 summarizes the relation between the identified mechanisms and
each of the previously reviewed theories.
Langland-Hassan Nichols / Stich Williamson
Voluntary initiation Top-down intention Premises into PWB Volunt. imag.
Real.-orient. dev. Lateral constraints Inference Mechanisms Involunt. imag.
Atypical dev. Cyclical top-down int. Script Elaborator -
Table 1: A common underlying structure for the theories of imagination.
Although we can see how the reviewed theories agree on an underlying
structure for the mechanisms of imagination, in the next section we argue
how, in order to provide a suitable basis for representing the dynamics of
imagination using a formal system, those mechanisms should be further re-
fined.
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2.5 Existing Logics of Imagination
When considering formal systems, few authors have ventured into the un-
charted seas of logic and imagination. In Lewis (1973), the author defines a
logic to account for counterfactual reasoning by using a system of spheres and
a modal operator that moves the evaluation point to counterfactual worlds.
Later, Niiniluoto (1985) formalizes imagination as a propositional attitude
and discusses some of its properties. In Costa-Leite (2011), the author goes
one step beyond and formalizes the distinction between “imagination”, “con-
ception” and “possibility” through following the intuitions of Descartes and
Hume. Wansing brings beliefs into the picture in Wansing (2017) and uses
neighborhood semantics and STIT mechanics to account for agentive imagi-
nation. In Priest (2016), the author focuses on imagining impossibilities and
defines a system that uses impossible worlds to model that. Through his works
Berto (2014), Berto (2017) and Berto (2018), Berto formalizes conceivability
in both a paraconsistent and a classical setting, and introduces the mechanics
of “aboutness”, which determine what is relevant for the agent to import con-
ceiving an alternative world. In relation to his work on aboutness, Giordani
(2019) defines an axiomatic system and proves its completeness.
Even though these works highlight very interesting features of imagina-
tion, they all represent imagination in static, pre-determined scenarios, like
snapshots of a specific moment. Although Wansing’s approach in Wansing
(2017) goes one step beyond and takes into account the agentive character
of imagination, it still works in predefined, tree-like structures: the agent can
be seen as “choosing” what to imagine, indeed, but these choices are already
contained in the initial model of the situation. Our approach aims to provide
a framework to capture something that has been overlooked in these previous
logical systems: imagination is, in essence, dynamic. Although we do not aim
to define a fully-fledged logical system, we argue that the algorithmic analysis
we provide for the dynamics of imaginary worlds can be used as a starting
point to define a logic that allows to expand its formal models dynamically.
3 The Common Frame for Imagination Acts
Although the mechanisms identified in the previous theories may seem precise
enough at first glance, we claim that they are not as specific as we need in order
to fully account for the dynamics involved in imaginary worlds. This is par-
ticularly true if we aim to capture those dynamics using a formal language or
a computer-based simulation. In particular, we claim that the reality-oriented
development embeds two different mechanisms that should be distinguished,
when aiming for a precise distinction of the processes involved in imagination
acts. An imaginary scenario can mirror the real world in many different ways.
Consider, for instance, an agent who decides to imagine a chessboard. Among
other reasons, she could be imagining a chessboard because:
1. She wants to paint one upon a canvas.
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2. She wants to decide which her next move in a game of chess, given a certain
setting of the pieces on the board.
According to each of these possibilities, the agent could develop her initial
imagining by:
1. Filling up the details about how the chessboard is; for instance, whether it
is made of wood, what color it is, and so on.
2. Considering the possible moves she could make and evaluating their con-
sequences.
Now, in the first case, should the agent be concerned with what could happen
in that scenario, meaning how the pieces could be moved across the board
during a game? If she is just imagining the chessboard because she wants to
paint one, then it would be of no use to go beyond the static details of the
scenario. Regarding the second case, should the agent be concerned with how
the chessboard is, like whether it is made of wood, or what material are the
pieces made of? If she just wants to assess which is her next best move, it
would be useless to focus on the static details of the chessboard, or its pieces.
When giving a closer look to how the existing theories of imagination define
reality-oriented development, we notice how this mechanism actually embeds
different ways of developing an imagining. As we see it, one could elaborate
the static details of the imagining (which would correspond to case 1 in the
previous chessboard example), without considering any kind of dynamic ac-
tion that could typically take place in it (which would correspond to case 2),
and the other way around. Although they both use reality-oriented inputs as
their parameters, the way they develop an imagining is different enough to
draw a distinction between them, specially if we aim to encode these mech-
anisms by using a formal, or algorithmic framework. On a formal level, the
main distinction between both cases would be that, in the second case of our
example, the system would need to take into account an action or event taking
place in there, while it would not need to do so in the first case. That is, the
dynamic elaboration of an imaginary scenario involves a certain change that
takes place in the imagining as a result of something happening there, whereas
the static elaboration just focuses on providing more details about a state of
affairs where nothing “happens”.
In the following subsections, we identify a refinement of the processes of
imagination and we group them under what we call the Common Frame for
Imagination Acts, which is a framework specially aimed at identifying and
distinguishing the different mechanisms involved in creating and developing
a representation of an imaginary world. Furthermore, we claim that this re-
fined framework is better suited as the basis for studying the dynamics of
imagination acts at a formal level. Once our proposal has been introduced, we
show where the previously-reviewed theories match with it, and where they
are actually collapsing distinct processes into a single mechanism.
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3.1 The Initialization
We call the first process of our frame the Initialization, and we associate to it
the question “what characterizes the initial scenario?”. It represent the agent
performing a voluntary mental action4 that creates a new imaginary world,
represented as a certain state of affairs fulfilling some initial premise. This
premise may be more or less specific; for instance, it can either be something
like “I am the singer of a jazz band”, or “I am the singer of a jazz band formed
by a piano, a double-bass and drums, where we are all wearing classy tuxedos”.
Either way, and be it more or less initially detailed, a new imaginary world
will be created.
Following the previously reviewed theories of imagination, this mechanism
aims to capture a kind of ceteris paribus imagination. In a nutshell, this means
that, aside from what the agent is voluntarily choosing as the content of the
new imagining, everything else is meant to be the same way as it is in the real
world —that is, as long as it is consistent with the content of what is being
imagined. In this sense, the Initialization process aims to create a “copy” of
the real world in which only the content of the initial premise, as well as
everything else needed to make that content consistent, is different from that
real world5. Although authors such as David Lewis, in Lewis (1973), discuss in
detail some issues that accommodating new content in a truly ceteris paribus
setting could have, those concerns fall outside the scope of our current work
and we leave them as future considerations.
· · · ϕ
Initial premise:
ϕ
Fig. 4: The Initialization creates a new imaginary world, given an initial premise.
Fig. 4 depicts the Initialization process, in which a new imaginary world is
created by using an initial premise ϕ. In order to provide a formal schema for
this process, we need to take into account the initial premise ϕ and the state
of affairs representing the real world wR, as believed by the agent that carries
out the process. Then, the Initialization algorithm, which we call AlgI , must
create a new, empty representation of a possible world, and clamp the initial
4 As the author points out in Balcerak-Jackson (2016), succeeding in such voluntary action
may vary depending on whether we are supposing, imagining or conceiving.
5 Note that, if possible worlds are used as formal models, imaginary worlds will then be
required to be formally consistent. Nevertheless, different authors, such as Priest (2016),
Berto (2017), or even Nichols and Stich in Nichols and Stich (2003) argue that one can
also imagine impossible scenarios. If we wanted to allow for paraconsistent imaginings, our
approach could be adapted to accommodate the use of impossible worlds in the way they
are used, for instance, in Berto (2017).
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premise ϕ in it —which we identify as the set of atomic formulas describing
its content6 of the formula ϕ. We can identify the mathematical structures
needed for this process as follows (for At being the set of atomic formulas of
the given formal language):
– Input:
Real world: wR = {pi | pi ∈ At and pi is the case in the real world}
Initial premise: ϕ (formula of the formal language)
– Algorithm:
AlgI(wR, ϕ)→ wϕ, where wϕ is the imaginary world created by clamping




(pj | pj is accounted for in ϕ)
Intuitively, the Initialization process requires an initial premise ϕ that the
agent wants to imagine, as well as a real world wR which will be used as the
world of reference from which the agent started the imagining. The algorithm
AlgI , then, takes the two input parameters and computes, as the output, a new
imaginary world wϕ. This new imaginary world is characterized by accounting
for the state of affairs represented by the initial premise ϕ. Although the world
of reference is not used in this step, world wR represents the state of affairs
the agent believes to be the case, and, as such, contains those believed factual
rules and scripts that will be used in further processes to elaborate on the
details of the imagining.
3.2 The Description
This second process, which we call the Description, and which answers the
question “what else is the case in the imaginary scenario?”, corresponds to
the “static” part of the development of an imaginary scenario. This process
involves filling up the details of how the initial imagining could be like, re-
garding what other facts could also be the case in there, but without moving
it into a new, different scenario that follows from any event, or action. We call
the kind of rules governing the static description of an imaginary scenario the
factual rules.
For example, an imaginary scenario initiated by the premise “we are having
a tea-party” may be enriched with details about the shape of the tea-pot, the
presence or absence of cookies on the table, the room we are in, the way people
are dressed, etc. Note how these new details are about the current scenario
6 In the formal definition, we use the expression “pj is accounted for in ϕ” to express the
fact that the truth conditions for the formula ϕ determine the truth-value of the atomic
formula pj by requiring it to be either true or false in the state of affairs described by ϕ.
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we are describing: we are not yet putting our imagining in motion, but just
forming a more detailed static version of the initial scenario.
We could draw an analogy with the language of propositional logic7, in
which factual rules would correspond to formulas of the sort t→ c∨k: “if there
is a tea-party, then there are also cookies or cake”. Note how, when considering
the previous formula in a possible-worlds semantics, atomic formulas c and k
refer to the same state that satisfies t: we are just adding details to it.
At this point is where our proposal starts departing from the previously
reviewed theories, and starts being also more detailed than them. Although,
when considering reality-oriented development, Nichols and Stich do mention
that both facts and scripts are involved in this process, they leave them both
to be handled by the Inference Mechanisms8, without providing any specific
details on how similar, or distinct the development using facts or scripts should
be. Langland-Hassan’s theory behaves similarly to Nichols and Stich’s, and
he attributes this static description process to the lateral constraints which,
again, are the same ones that govern how the scenario would typically unfold,
regarding the actions or events that could take place in there. The same applies
to Williamson’s theory: involuntary imagination handles both the description
of the imagined scenario, and unfolding the way it would typically evolve.
The framework we are just defining, then, should be seen as a more precise
account of the differences between distinct processes involved in the so-called





Fig. 5: The Description process elaborates on the static details of the scenario.
Fig. 5 represents how the Description process works9. Note how this process
also uses a world of reference as a starting point, but, conversely to the case of
the Initialization process, this one needs the world of reference to be imaginary.
We refer to the world of reference as wϕ. For the sake of clarity, this would could
be interpreted as being the imaginary world created during the Initialization
7 For a comprehensive introduction to propositional logic, see Hodges (2001), for instance.
8 Particularly, on page 118 of Nichols and Stich (2000), they identify both processes as the
inferential elaboration, without distinguishing between their static or dynamic character.
9 It is important to note that Figure 5 is not meant to be a Kripke model, but rather just
a schematic representation of the process. As such, and in order to stress out the fact that
this process elaborates on the details of the same imaginary world, we represent believed
factual rules using standard propositional logic and without any kind of modal operator.
Figure 5, then, aims to represent how the world on the left changes into the world on the
right, rather than representing that both worlds are different, in terms of possible-worlds
semantics. For more details on modal logic, see Blackburn et al. (2010).
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process: after all, one cannot elaborate on the details of an imagining, unless
such imagining has been already created.
In this process, the agent starts to elaborate on how the details of that
initial imaginary world would be, considering what would follow from the
initial premise used in the previous process. In this case, however, instead of
using formula ϕ as the premise to create a new imaginary world, the agent
would browse her believed factual rules, to which we formally refer as a set
Fact, in order to see what else would be the case in the imaginary world, given
ϕ. In this process, we refer to ϕ as the focus the agent uses to unfold what
else would be the case in the imagining. In particular, the agent’s factual rules
correspond to a set of rules that represent expressions of the kind10 “if ϕ were
the case, then ψ would also be the case”.
– Input:
Imaginary world: wϕ (an already existing imaginary world)
Focus: ϕ (the initial premise used to create wϕ)
Believed fact. rule: ζ ∈ Fact, where ζ has the form (ϕ→ ψ)
– Algorithm:
AlgD(wϕ, ϕ, ζ)→ wψ, where wψ is the imaginary world expanded by
adding those additional facts pi that can be inferred from having ϕ, and
as specified by the factual rule ζ, as well as removing those facts pj that




(pi | pi is accounted for in ψ) ∪⋃
(pj | pj ∈ wϕ and (pj ∧ ψ) 6≡ ⊥)
10 Note that, although this kind of expressions can be mapped into Lewis’ account of
counterfactuals in Lewis (1973), the way they are used in our approach is different. Whereas
Lewis’ approach of such expression would “move” the point of evaluation to a different
world where both antecedent and consequent are the case, our approach “breaks down” the
evaluation in two different steps. First, it checks whether the antecedent is already the case
in the current world and, if so, then creates a new world, which represents a refinement
of the current one, and in which the consequent also holds. The notion of “refinement”
can be, in fact, a bit controversial when thinking about possible worlds; after all, possible
worlds are maximally consistent sets of formulas in which each and every atomic formula is
already assigned a truth-value. We use the term “refinement” is a more informal or intuitive
way. Even if the truth-value of all atomic formulas needs to be set in our imaginary worlds,
their truth-value may be the result of importing it from the world of reference, instead of
determining what is should be by looking at how the imagining develops. In this sense, and
even if the technical apparatus behind a classical approach requires all atomic formulas to
have a truth-value, by “refining” the world we mean that, by pulling onto certain factual
beliefs, the agent “realizes” that the truth-value of certain atomic formulas should change
in the imagining, with respect to what they were before. In this sense, “refining” a world
could be understood as “updating” the truth-values of certain atomic formulas step-by-
step, given the factual rules believed by the agent. Those “refinement” steps could be seen
as specific executions of some of the broader sets of inferential mechanisms identified by
previous authors.
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On an intuitive level, the Description process takes an already existing
imaginary world wϕ, created through imagining an initial premise ϕ, and elab-
orates on what else would be the case in the imagining by considering ϕ and
a factual rule ζ of the form ϕ → ψ. In this case, algorithm AlgD adds to the
imagining those atomic formulas pi that account for ψ, while removing those
atomic formulas pj that already exist in the imagining, and which would con-
tradict the new ones. The new imaginary world wψ, then, is defined following
two different steps:
1. The atomic formulas pi belonging to the new content ψ have priority over
what was already the case in the world used as the input, and therefore
are clamped firstly.
2. Then, the atomic formulas pj that were the case in the world wϕ used as
the input are kept into the new world, as long as they do not contradict
with any of the atoms pi clamped in there.
This same procedure when elaborating the details of an imaginary world will
be followed in the following processes in order to prioritize the new content
being imagined, while ensuring that the resulting imaginary world, once the
rest of the atomic formulas have been imported, is consistent with those.
3.3 The Default Evolution
We call the third process the Default Evolution, and we associate it to the
question “what would typically happen in the imaginary scenario?”. The main
point of this process is to determine, still by using reality-oriented inputs
based on the agent’s beliefs, how the scenario could typically evolve, or “move
forward”, regarding what events or actions could take place in there. We call
the kind of inputs describing the possible ways a scenario could move forward
the scripts11.
For instance, in the previous example initiated with the premise “we are
having a tea-party”, our believed scripts about tea-parties could tell us some-
thing about how the scenario may typically “move forward”, how people would
typically behave, or what actions could take place in there. A few examples
could be, for instance, “if I am in a tea-party, I could pour tea into my cup”, or
11 In Funkhouser and Spaulding (2009), the authors use the term “script” to refer to
something that can be imitated or enacted, and that can guide action without the need
of being backed up by beliefs or knowledge. Our use of the term differs from theirs in the
sense that, in our account, scripts are not meant to guide an actual action, but rather to
set, according to the current state of the imaginary scenario, which actions or events could
take place in there. In particular, our scripts encode something like “in a situation in which
such and such was the case, executing action α could lead to this set of outcomes”. Scripts,
then, are neither guides to enact an action, nor a way to assign a tendency to certain actions
to happen in an imaginary scenario, but rather a way of determining what an action could
bring about, given the conditions of such scenario. Therefore, although both our and their
use of the term “script” has some similarities, as in both cases it concerns actions that could
happen in an imaginary scenario, in our setting scripts are just meant to open new modal
paths opened up by certain actions or events.
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“if there is a tea-party, everyone is going to sip tea slowly, in a well-educated
manner”. Note how, with respect to the factual rules used by the Description
process, these scripts do not provide information regarding what else could be
the case in there —meaning what other facts could be true in that state of
affairs12, or how the scenario could look like. Instead, they rather tell us what
could happen, or what I could do in that scenario. They are not tokens that
provide further details about the state of affairs of the current static scenario,
but rather tokens that describe how some “accessible”, “possible”, or “future”
scenarios based on the current one could be reached through the occurrence
of a certain action or event. Conversely to the Description process, where the
agent chooses to focus on certain static details (represented by a certain logical
formula), the focus in the Default Evolution process is instead the action that
the agent imagines to happen in the imaginary world, and which would bring
about a series of changes to the state of affairs.
When considering how this would be expressed using a formal setting, we
find that actions are often represented as being transitions between states,
rather than states (or part of states) themselves. If we compare, for instance,
Propositional Modal Logic (we refer again to Blackburn et al. (2010)) with
Propositional Dynamic Logic, or PDL (see Harel (1984)), we can see that one
of the main differences between both is that PDL identifies actions (called “pro-
grams” in PDL) as the triggers for changes between state of affairs. Moreover,
in PDL these actions are bind to the accessibility relations between different
states, rather than to the states themselves. In this sense, actions are repre-
sented in such a way that they cause a change between two different “static”
states of affairs. Following this, we interpret the scripts responsible of the De-
fault Evolution process not by having actions as part of their “final state”,
such as t → ♦p (where p corresponds to the action “pour tea into my cup”),
but rather by being “state changers” that bring about a different situation,
such as t→ 〈p〉f , where t correspond to “there is a tea party”, p corresponds
to the action “pour tea into my cup”, and f corresponds to the fact “my cup
is full”. Note that, interpreted in such a way, actions or events are not the
outcomes of our scripts, but rather the way and the cause that affects the
current state of affairs in some way. The main difference between the scripts
12 It could be argued that, in fact, scripts do provide some information regarding what
actions are most likely to occur in a certain scenario. Nevertheless, the structures we use to
define our approach do not allow to capture, at least not explicitly, this notion of “typicality”,
or “likeliness” for an action to happen in a given scenario. Instead, our approach assumes
that the agent already has scripts about every possible action available; what makes an
action “executable” in a certain scenario, then, is determined by the conditions that the
script should fulfill in order to bring about its consequences. More intuitively, the action
“pour tea into a cup” would only have an actual effect in those scenarios in which, for
instance, there is a cup and a tea pot, but it will not affect, say, a scenario where there are
only apples and oranges on a table. Even though our approach, as it is, cannot yet account
for updating the likeliness of certain actions to be imagined in particular scenarios, it could
be extended by including a kind of “sorted preference list” over scripts for the imagining
being entertained. The list would have to be ordered in such a way that, the closer the
current imagining is to the preconditions of a particular script, the more relevant this script
becomes in the list, and thus the more likely it is to be selected by the agent.
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used in this process, and the factual rules used in the Description process,
is that these scripts do not tell us anything new about the same scenario in
which t is the case, whereas the factual rules of the Description process do.
The scripts, instead, require that a certain event or action takes places, and
thus they require that the current, static “snapshot” of the state of affairs
moves forward.
Again, and as a consequence of not distinguishing between the static and
the dynamic elaboration of an imaginary scenario, this process is also em-
bedded into Langland-Hassan’s lateral constraints, into Nichols and Stich’s












Fig. 6: The Default Evolution process opens possible outcomes of the scenario.
Fig. 6 represents the Default Evolution process. Note how, unlike the De-
scription process, in this case the scripts are not used to elaborate on the
details of the current imaginary scenario in a static way, but rather to evalu-
ate the possible ways in which such scenario could “evolve”, or move forward.
Obviously, a specific scenario could usually move forward in many different
ways; it is up to the agent, then, to decide which course of events she wants
to choose in her imagining. Similarly to the case of the Description process,
though, the agent elaborates on the details of an already existing imaginary
world. The difference in this case, however, is that the Default Evolution cap-
tures a dynamic change in the imaginary scenario —that is, a change caused
by a certain event happening, or an action being carried out by the agent
involved in the imagining.
– Input:
Imaginary world: wψ (an already existing imaginary world)
Focus (Action): α (a formula of the language accounting for an action)
Believed scripts: {θk}α ⊆ Script, where each θi has the form (γ → 〈α〉δ),
and where α is the action the agent imagines to happen.
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– Algorithm:
AlgE(wψ, α, {θk}α)→ {wχi}, where {wχi} is the set of imaginary worlds
and each wχi is an imaginary world expanded by adding the atomic facts
pkj , according to each script θk of the form γk → 〈α〉δk, as a result of the
agent imagining that action α happens, and provided that the antecedent
γk is the case in world wψ.
– Output:
{wχi}, where each wχi =
⋃
(pj | pj is accounted for in δi) ∪⋃
(pk | pk ∈ wψ and (pk ∧ δi) 6≡ ⊥)
Regarding the intuitions behind this process, the agent takes an imaginary
world wψ as the starting point (where other processes of imagination, such
as the Description process, could have already happened) and then browses
over her believed scripts. These scripts be expressed using formulas of the
form γ → 〈α〉δ, which capture that “if γ were the case, and event α were to
happen, then δ could also be the case”. In this case, then, the agent does not
take as focus a formula of the world of reference, but rather she imagines that
an action α happens in the imagining. As a result, the agent must browse over
all her beliefs regarding action α and then, whenever the antecedent of such
beliefs is met in the world of reference, elaborate on the consequences that such
action would have on the imagining. AlgE does that and, as a result, might
return as an output not just a single imaginary world, but possibly a set of
different imaginary worlds, depending on the scripts believed by the agent.
Similarly to what happened in the Description process, the atomic formulas
imported from the world of reference would give priority to the new atomic
formulas just added in order to ensure consistency.
3.4 The Unscripted Additions
We call the last process identified in our frame the Unscripted Addition, and
we associate it to the question “how does the agent voluntarily change the
scenario?”. This process corresponds to those ways of developing an imaginary
scenario that are not typical, and which would not follow from reality-oriented
rules or scripts.
Note how the question with which we characterize this process strongly
emphasizes the voluntary intention of the agent to go “off-rails” with addi-
tions that deviate from what one would expect to be the case, or happen in
the imagining. As the agent chooses again a new premise to be put into the
imaginary scenario, this process behaves like the Initialization process of our
framework13. The agent adds a new premise into an already existing imagi-
nary scenario, and then the cycle of filling up the details, imagining how the
13 In Fact, Langland-Hassan argues that these kind of additions, which Nichols and Stich
attribute to their opaque Script Elaborator, are nothing more than new premises that the
agent clamps to the imaginary scenario.
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scenario moves forward, and coming up with yet another off-script premise,
begins again.
Unlike the Initialization process, which is responsible for creating a brand-
new imaginary scenario, these additions are built upon an already existing
imaginary scenario that is already specified up to a certain point. The new
premises added by this process may be completely new, but they may still
override something already set in a previous imagining. If the new premise
can be held together with what is already the case in the imagining, so be it;
otherwise, it should override whatever was already the case in there that con-
flicts with it. In other words: these new premises have priority over everything
else.
This process can be mapped into Langland-Hassan’s cyclical involvement
of top-down intentions and into Nichols and Stich’s Script Elaborator. As we
have already argued, Williamson’s theory does not consider this mechanism of
imagination acts, as he is interested in the development of imaginary scenarios








Fig. 7: The Unscripted Addition adds a new premise into the imaginary world.
Fig. 7 represents the Unscripted Addition process. Note how this process is,
in accordance to Langland-Hassan’s theory, pretty similar to the Initialization.
These kind of additions are neither implied by any kind of factual rule, nor
script; instead, they are voluntarily added by the agent. The reason for adding
a new premise into the imaginary scenario follows a desire to elaborate the
scenario in a certain way. In this case, the agent chooses an already existing
imaginary world wχ and a new premise ε to voluntarily clamp into it. The
resulting world should account for this new clamped premise ε and should
import every other atomic fact that is the case in the world of reference wχ,
as long as it does not contradict with the new information being added.
– Input:
Imaginary world: wχ (an already existing imaginary world)
New premise: ε (formula of the formal language)
– Algorithm:
AlgA(wχ, ε)→ wε, where wε is the new imaginary world created by
clamping the set of atoms pi ∈ ε, as well as importing those atoms
pj ∈ wχ that do not contradict ε.




(pi | pi is accounted for in ε) ∪⋃
(pj | pj ∈ wχ and (pj ∧ ε) 6≡ ⊥)
On an intuitive level, the Unscripted Additions mimics the behavior of the
Initialization process, but with an important difference: the world of reference
wχ, in this case, needs to be an imaginary world, instead of a real one. Then,
the agent chooses a new premise ε, which do not derive from any of her factual
rules or scripts, and clamps it to elaborate the imagining into a new imaginary
world wε.
3.5 Binding Everything Together
Up to this point, we have identified and refined, with respect to the reviewed
existing theories of imagination, what we claim are the four distinct processes
involved in the creation and development of imaginary worlds that result from
voluntary acts of imagination. Note, however, that most of these processes
are not required to be performed in a sequential way; in fact, the only one
that is indeed required to happen in a specific order is the first one, namely
the Initialization. After all, without a voluntary mental action initiating an
imagining, it would not be possible to develop such imagining any further.
The other three processes, nonetheless, could be (and usually are) performed
in a mixed way, without necessarily following any order.
The framework identified in the Common Frame for Imagination Acts can
be summarized, in comparison to the previously reviewed theories, in Table
2. As we can see, the theories of imagination we have reviewed earlier fail to
distinguish between the Description and the Default Evolution processes, and
they collapse both within a reality-oriented development step. Even though
these two processes are, indeed, related to the development of the imaginary
world by following reality-oriented rules, we claim that, in order to capture
and reproduce those dynamics in a formal way, these two processes should be
clearly distinguished.
[authors] Langland-Hassan Nichols / Stich Williamson
Initialization Top-down intention Premises into PWB Volunt. imag.
Description
Lateral constraints Inference Mechanisms Involunt. imag.
Default Evo.
Unscripted Add. Cyclical top-down int. Script Elaborator -
Table 2: The Common Frame with respect to other theories of imagination.
The reasons behind why we think that separating the Description from the
Default Evolution process is important are many-folded.
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On the one hand, and following previous works in formal logic such as
Propositional Dynamic Logic (see Harel (1984)), we argue that actions, or
events, should be distinguished from facts in a formal setting. While possible
worlds aim to represent what is the case in a current state of affairs, actions
are often seen not as “properties” of a certain state, but rather as state-
changers, or transitions that affect a state of affairs in a certain way. This way
of interpreting actions follows from the way Propositional Dynamic Logic,
or PDL, represents “programs” as transitions between states. According to
this interpretation, possible worlds represent “snapshots” of static scenarios
in which the atomic formulas account for facts, whereas actions, or programs
in the case of PDL, capture the cause that triggered a change in that static
state.
On the other hand, we claim that it is important to distinguish both pro-
cesses in order to implicitly bring the notion of time into the picture. In partic-
ular, an imaginary scenario that is being further developed in terms of what
else could be the case in there does not need to “be put in motion”. Like
a painting, a depiction of a static state of affairs becomes more and more
detailed without the need of time passing —at least not within the state of
affairs itself. Conversely, whenever an action or event occurs, it occurs within
a certain period of time, even if it is just a millisecond. Furthermore, those
actions, and therefore the states of affairs they bring about, get implicitly set
into an ordered sequence of static states and state-changers that potentially
affect them in some way. Although time is not explicitly taken into account in
our approach, distinguishing actions beforehand as transitions between states
opens up the possibility of bringing time into the picture14.
This, in turn, potentially allows our models to be used for different pur-
poses. As we argue in Section 4, certain uses of imagination may be mostly
concerned with possible executions of actions —like planning in a game of
chess. Similarly, other uses of imagination focus on a single, static scenario,
with no, or little involvement of actions occurring over time. This can also
be useful when imaginatively evolving a narrative backwards in time, or even
to model some sort of abductive reasoning in which, given a certain state of
affairs, the agent imaginatively follows possible courses of actions backwards
in time.
We consider that our analysis of the dynamics of imagination acts can be
taken as a suitable underlying framework for the modeling of how imaginary
worlds are created and developed, when performing one of such acts of imagi-
nation. Moreover, we also claim that the Common Frame for Imagination Acts
14 It is only fair to note how, considering the way the Description algorithm works, it
still creates a new state of affairs related via an accessibility relation. Nevertheless, and
conversely to what happens with the Default Evolution, this transition is purely meant
to capture a refinement of a static scenario, rather than an actual event occurring in the
scenario being represented. In other words, these refinements can be interpreted as small
“reasoning steps” similar to those that appear in Velazquez Quesada (2011). If a formal
layer for time was to be added to our approach, only those transitions labeled with an
action would represent an actual change in time, whereas those transitions resulting from
an execution of the Description would still represent a scenario at the same time instant.
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can be used as a solid starting point when defining a formal system account-
ing for the way imaginary worlds are created, as we do in [authors]. Even
though the previously reviewed theories already identified the main mecha-
nisms involved in imagination acts, their analysis was not detailed enough to
be translated into a formal or computational setting. Our proposal amends
this caveat by being more specific, and splitting two processes embedded in
the reality-oriented development mechanism.
When considering the formal details that each process would likely need to
satisfy, we identified the inputs, algorithms and outputs that would account for
each mechanism. Table 3 provides a general comparison between the sketched
formal details of each process in order to provide an overview of their main
similarities and differences on a mathematical level.
Process Input Algorithm Output
Initialization wR, ϕ Alg
I(wR, ϕ)→ wϕ wϕ
Description wϕ, ϕ, ζ ∈ Factϕ AlgD(wϕ, ϕ, ζ)→ wψ wψ
Default Evo. wψ , α, {θk}α ⊆ Script AlgE(wψ , α, {θk}α)→ {wχi} {wχi}
Unscripted Add. wχ, ε AlgA(wχ, ε)→ wε wε
Table 3: The Common Frame with respect to other theories of imagination.
3.6 Remarks on the Description and the Default Evolution
In the previous pages we have identified two distinct processes, namely the
Description and the Default Evolution, as being responsible for elaborating
an imaginary scenario. This elaboration is done by following certain factual
rules and scripts detailing, respectively, what else could be the case in the
imagining, or what could happen in there. Our aim is to provide a detailed
identification of the processes involved in imaginary worlds, but we do not
provide any further insights on the issue of how, exactly, does the agent get
to choose one over the other, as it would fall outside the scope of this work.
If, while imagining being in a tea-party, the agent can both infer that there
could be a cake, but also that there could not be one, what is it that makes
him elaborate the imagining in one way, instead of the other?
In Walton (1990), the author explores the so-called Principles of Genera-
tion, which aim to answer the question of why we develop our imaginings in
certain ways, and by following certain rules. Similarly, in Van Leeuwen (2013)
the author explores the rules that govern constructive imagining, such as the
Belief Governance Thesis or the Genre Truth Governance Thesis, and which
determine how, and why, we infer new details in them. In a similar way, but
specifically focusing on pretense, Rucińska (2016) explores the same issue.
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As we have said, the aim of the present paper is to identify the processes
used when creating imaginary worlds, and specifically to distill a structure
than can be later translated into a formal setting. Due to this, we do not deal
with what specifically guides the choosing of one rule over the other. Instead,
we refer to the literature mentioned in the previous paragraph for more on
this topic.
Furthermore, and even though we do not aim to provide a detailed defini-
tion of the algorithms in the present work, there are a few particularities and
requirements that those algorithms would need to fulfill, and which we want
to briefly point out.
Particularly, and being both reality-oriented and based on the agent’s be-
liefs, the Description and the Default Evolution algorithms leave some open
questions regarding what kind of algorithms they are, and how they could
be encoded properly. Although the computational definition of “algorithm” is
usually understood as being deterministic and deductive in nature, algorithms
that aim to capture how background beliefs affect an imaginary scenario should
probably be thought of as being more inductive in nature.
This, however, would depend on what particular facts, or actions, the rule
or script is about. Taking scripts as an example, actions about which the agent
has some knowledge, or a high degree of belief, would probably be encoded
more deductively than those about which the agent has a softer form of belief.
Examples of actions which consequences would be inferred deductively would
involve, for instance, laws of nature, such as the laws of physics —that is, un-
less the imaginary scenario explicitly violates some of those rules. Conversely,
actions about which the agent has no strong beliefs, or that somehow depend
on skill, or chance, would not normally be expected to have a deterministic
outcome —unless the conditions in which they are executed force it. Examples
of such actions would include rolling some dice with their many possible out-
comes, or trying to jump across a 2-meter wide mountain stream. The same
would apply in the case of factual rules, of course. Whereas a rule such as “if
there is a fire, is smoke” would be applied in a deductive fashion, a rule like
“if there is a tea-party, there are cookies” is much less certain to hold in every
tea-party scenario —regardless of how tasty it sounds.
Both the Description and the Default Evolution, therefore, must be able
to account for factual rules and scripts that are more or less deductive, or
inductive. This, however, could be handled not by the algorithm itself, but
rather by the form of each specific rule and script. In particular, rules and
scripts that aim to be deductive in nature would need to ensure that every
possible world created as a result of executing the relevant algorithms fulfill
the outcomes they are describing; the notion of “necessity”, taken from alethic
modal logic (see Blackburn et al. (2010)), captures this requirement. Similarly,
rules and scripts aiming to capture a less strict, more inductive kind of rule
would need to make use of the notion of “possibility”, again taken from alethic
modal logic, to represent that their outcomes is not so certain. It would even
be possible, by using certain mechanics from probabilistic modal logic (see
Shirazi and Amir (2007)), to represent how likely each outcome would be.
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When formally defining the algorithms, then, they should be made in such a
way that they can distinguish, and act in accordance to, these two kinds of
factual rules and scripts.
3.7 An Example: Towards Modeling Thought Experiments
In order to show how our framework could be applied to a formal represen-
tation of imagination acts, we briefly sketch how a commonly known thought
experiment, used to prove that the universe was infinite (see Sorensen (1992)),























Fig. 8: Modeling thought experiments with the Common Frame.
Figure 8 shows how the thought experiment unfolds by applying the pro-
cesses identified in our framework. The steps depicted in such figure, from left
to right, correspond to the following ones:
1. Initially, the agent does not know whether the universe is infinite (i) or
not (note that we represent the initial world to be a real world by using a
dotted line).
2. The agent initiates the thought experiment by imagining, or supposing,
that the universe is not infinite (¬i) This is done through the Initialization
process, and creates a new imaginary world with the initial premise ¬i.
3. Then, the agent uses one of her factual rules stating that “if the universe
was not infinite, there would be an edge of the universe” (¬i → e). This
uses the Description process to elaborate on the static details of the new
imaginary world focusing on ¬i, and concluding that e would also be the
case in such imagining.
4. Once the agent concludes that there is an edge of the universe in her
imagining, she imagines what would happen if she threw a spear at the
edge of the universe, represented by action α. This, following her believed
scripts about the consequences of α, pulls the script e→ 〈α〉(t ∨ b), which
accounts for “if there were an edge of the universe, and I threw a spear at
it, it would either go through (t), or it would bounce back (b)”. For the sake
of clarity, we account for those two consequences separately by using two
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different imaginary worlds in Figure 8. This elaboration is done through
the Default Evolution process.
5. Then, in order to see what else would be the case in the new imaginary
worlds, the agent browses again over her factual rules to see that, firstly,
“if the spear went through (t), then the edge would be a limit between the
universe and something beyond it (l)”. This, again, uses the Description
process. Similarly, in the other imaginary world, the agent uses the factual
rule “if the spear bounced back (b), then the edge would be a limit between
the universe and something beyond it (l)”, which also adds formula l to
the imagining.
6. Last, but not least, the agent uses the Description process again in both
scenarios to conclude that, “if there was a limit between the universe and
something beyond it (l), then the universe would be infinite (i)”, thus
deriving i in both imaginary worlds, and thus contradicting her initial
assumption of ¬i being the case (in Figure 8 we cross out the inconsistent
worlds, while highlighting the contradictory formulas in bold font).
7. Although our framework does not account for the mechanics of “taking
information back” to the real world, or learning, such example would need
a way of taking that contradiction back to the real world in order to add
the new information about the universe being, in fact, infinite (i), thus
changing the information the agent had in the real world.
4 The Rhombus of Imagination
In this section, we introduce a visual tool aimed to provide a straight-forward
way of representing up to which point different kinds of imagination acts rely
on each of the processes identified in the Common Frame for Imagination Acts,
and which we call the Rhombus of Imagination. By being able to compare,
at a single glance, how similar and different some kinds of imagination acts
are, with respect to their dynamics, we argue that it is possible to distill
certain properties that characterize the procedural structure of those kinds of
imagination acts.
The Rhombus of Imagination is formed by a main rhombus shape15, which
we call the outer rhombus, and in which each vertex corresponds to one of
the processes of the Common Frame for Imagination Acts. Each vertex is con-
nected to the center of the outer rhombus by a line, which is used to measure
how much a certain kind of imagination acts rely on using that particular pro-
cess. Specifically, the farther away from the center of the rhombus, the more
it relies on that process. We divide each line in three distinguished measures,
each one corresponding to a certain degree of relevance:
1. The first measure, coinciding with the center of the outer rhombus, cor-
responds to a marginal use of a particular process; this represents that a
15 When considering other, more specific kinds of imagination acts, it could be necessary
to add additional vertex to the rhombus. For instance, a vertex accounting for actions, in
the case of pretense, or another one accounting for emotions, in the case of empathy.
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certain kind of imagination acts does not rely at all, or very little, on that
specific process, and that its uses are almost negligible in the overall act.
2. The second measure, placed at the center of the line, corresponds to a
standard use of the process; it is used regularly during the act of imagina-
tion and it adds useful information to the imaginary world that is being
entertained.
3. The third measure, placed at the vertex of the outer rhombus, corresponds
to a high use of the process; it is considered to be crucial in order to reach
the goal the agent had in mind when engaging in such act of imagination.
Therefore, when evaluating a specific kind of acts of imagination using this
tool, we draw a rhomboidal shape, called the inner rhombus and embedded
within the outer rhombus, and which corresponds to a sort of blue-print rep-
resenting the way this kind of imagination acts use each one of the processes.












Fig. 9: The Rhombus of Imagination.
In order to analyze different kinds of imagination acts, we must consider
acts of imagination in a general way; that is, how much do imagination acts
of a certain kind usually rely on each process. Obviously, different instances
of acts of imagination use each one of the different processes in different ways,
but what the Rhombus of Imagination aims to capture is how relevant they
typically are, for that particular kind of imagination acts. In order to show how
the Rhombus works, let’s consider three different cases: hypothetical reasoning,
story-telling, and engaging in a preexisting fiction.
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4.1 Hypothetical Reasoning
Hypothetical reasoning is used to guide our actions and enhance our knowledge
and beliefs about the real world. In this setting, therefore, imagination is highly
constrained by reality-oriented rules and facts, as argued by authors such as
Williamson (2016), Balcerak-Jackson (2016), or Spaulding (2016). Coming up
with unexpected plot twists, or evolving the scenario in ways it would seldom
do, falls outside the point of these kind of imagination acts. When defining the
Rhombus of Imagination for Hypothetical Reasoning, we identify the following
patterns:
1. Hypothetical reasoning requires the initial details of the imaginary scenario
to be clearly set in order to ensure that the unfolding of further details will
be reliable. We consider that hypothetical reasoning makes a high use of
the Initialization process.
2. When entertaining an hypothetical scenario, one can be concerned with
how a static scenario would be. For instance, when imagining how the
staging of a theater play could be, or how one could decorate a room for a
surprise birthday party, hypothetical reasoning allows us to foresee how a
scenario would look like, rather than what would happen in there. In this
sense, hypothetical reasoning often makes a high use of the Description
process as well.
3. One of the most common uses of hypothetical reasoning usually involves
predicting which events would take place in an alternative scenario, if it
was real. Thus, it also makes a high use of the Default Evolution process.
4. In hypothetical reasoning we are not interested in voluntarily adding facts
to the hypothetical scenario that would hardly follow, if it was real. There-
fore, hypothetical reasoning makes a marginal use of the Unscripted Ad-
dition step.
Following the previous considerations, the Rhombus of Hypothetical Reason-
ing is as shown in Fig. 10. As it can be seen, this sort of imagination acts
make extensive use of three of the processes identified in the proposed Com-
mon Frame for Imagination Acts, but it neglects the Unscripted Additions,
which is consistent with the fact that their goal is to provide trustworthy
information based on our knowledge and beliefs about the real world.
4.2 Story-Telling
Things change dramatically, though, when considering other kinds of imag-
ination acts. When engaging in, say, story-telling, theater improvisation, or
pretense play, the aim of such imaginings often goes beyond developing imagi-
nary scenarios in the way they would normally do, if they were real. Instead, we
usually expect for unexpected, or amusing things to happen in those fictional
scenarios. Although reality-oriented rules and facts16 should also be present
16 In paradigmatic cases of fiction, such as medieval fantasy stories, this set of reality-
oriented rules and facts is not only formed by those rules the agent believes about the







Fig. 10: The Rhombus of Hypothetical Reasoning.
in order to build a common grounds in which the imagining takes place, once
the scenario has been set we need something else to make these imaginative
episodes genuinely interesting.
Therefore, we need imagination to come up with unexpected twists and
funny, or tragic situations that would not naturally follow from the imagined
scenario. The Rhombus of Story-Telling can be defined by the following pat-
terns:
1. As argued in the hypothetical reasoning case, every act of imagination
makes use of this step: after all, it is through it that the imaginary scenario
is created. However, the initial conditions describing an imaginary scenario
are not usually as important when engaging in story-telling as they are in
hypothetical reasoning; at least, the consequences of initiating the scenario
with a less strict set of initial premises are not as severe in this case. Thus,
we consider that story-telling makes a standard use of the Initialization
step.
2. Embellishing the initial scenario with details regarding how the scenario
looks like is usual in this kind of imaginings. This process is responsible
for describing what elements are there in a pretense tea-party, for instance.
Therefore, this kind of imagination acts makes a standard use of the De-
scription step as well.
3. Similarly, allowing the imaginary scenario to evolve in ways it would typi-
cally do is something usual in this case. The Default Evolution is not what
characterizes this kind of imagination acts, but nevertheless it is present,
and we typically make use of it throughout the imaginative scenario. Thus,
real, actual world, but also by those rules that usually apply to the fictional setting being
depicted. This latter kinds of rules correspond to Genre Truths, as identified in Funkhouser
and Spaulding (2009). Additionally, but still related to this kind of paradigmatic rules, Lewis
(1978) offers an account on how to assess truth in fiction.
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this kind of imagination acts make a standard use of the Default Evolution
step.
4. Good stories usually tell us something unexpected, funny, interesting, mys-
terious, or tragic. These unexpected twists are seldom considered “usual
ways” a scenario would typically develop, and so they fall under the scope
of the Unscripted Additions. This is the most characteristic part of this








Fig. 11: The Rhombus of Story-Telling.
The Rhombus of Story-Telling is as shown in Fig. 11. As we can see, and
when comparing it to the rhombus in Fig. 10, they are dramatically differ-
ent. The Rhombus of Story-Telling has a highly-pointed vertex towards the
Unscripted Additions, whereas the Rhombus of Hypothetical Reasoning is
completely flat on that side. Conversely, the latter makes a high use of the
processes that rely on reality-oriented rules and scripts, whereas their use is
lower in the Rhombus of Story-Telling.
4.3 Engaging in a Preexisting Fiction
There is yet another kind of imagination act we want to represent: engaging in
an already existing fiction —say, by reading a novel, or by listening to someone
telling a story. The interest beyond this kind of imagination acts lies in the fact
that, while being related to story-telling as well, the role of the agent changes
dramatically, depending on whether the agent is the one telling the story (or
writing the book), or listening to it (or reading it). Whereas in story-telling
the agent is the one who creates the story, and thus has to use plenty of her
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own imaginative resources to tailor it, when the agent becomes the “receiver”
of an existing fiction her imaginative resources are highly guided by the story
being told.
The patterns followed when engaging in a fiction, and that determine the
shape of the Rhombus of Imagination for this kind of imagination acts, are as
follows:
1. As it happens when considering hypothetical reasoning, this step is crucial
when engaging in a preexisting fiction in order to properly follow the story
afterwards. The premises describing the scenarios involved in the story
are being fed into our imagination in a way that allows us to imagine and
follow what happens in them. Therefore, this step is of great importance in
this sort of imagination acts, and we consider that engaging in preexisting
fictions involves a high use of the Initialization step.
2. Although many details regarding how the scenario looks like can be given
by the story-teller, many other details are left unspecified. All these un-
specified details, although being prompted by a certain set of initial details,
fall within the second process identified in our Common Frame. Thus, we
assign a standard use of the Description step to this kind of imagination
acts.
3. A similar thing happens regarding the way an imaginary scenario would
usually evolve. While listening to a story, we do not imagine the characters
doing what we think they would usually do, but rather doing what the
story tells us they do. We do, however, assume certain “off-story” actions
when prompted with certain clues, or when there is a time lapse in the
story. Due to this, this kind of imagination acts make a standard use of
the Default Evolution step as well.
4. Regarding the last process, its use is practically negligible in this kind of
imagination acts. When listening to, or reading a story, we do not imagine
that the characters do something different as what we are being told, nor
we imagine that the story takes place somewhere else. Therefore, engaging
in a preexisting fiction makes a marginal use of the Unscripted Additions.
The Rhombus of Engaging in a Preexisting Fiction is represented in Fig. 12.
There are some interesting things we can say when comparing this Rhombus to
the previous ones; in particular, neither the Rhombus of Hypothetical Reason-
ing (in Fig. 10), nor this one, make any use of the Unscripted Additions. The
reasons for this are that both uses of imagination are constrained by a very
specific set of rules and scripts, and they both aim to develop the imaginary
scenario (be it reality-oriented or not) by following these rules and scripts.
When engaging in hypothetical reasoning, we draw from our own knowledge
and beliefs about reality in order to unfold the imaginary scenario; when en-
gaging in a fiction, we are given the way an imaginary scenario advances, and
we only make a light use of our knowledge and belief to embellish it. How-
ever, we do not intentionally deviate the scenario from what these rules and
scripts tell us in neither case. Regarding the Rhombus of Story-Telling (in Fig.
11), their differences result from a “role-switching”: being the one who comes
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up with the story requires a quite different use of one’s imaginative resources
than being the one who listens to it. This is represented by the fact that both








Fig. 12: The Rhombus of Engaging in a Preexisting Fiction.
4.4 The Rhombus as an Analysis Tool for Imagination Acts
By exploring the different ways in which imagination can be put to use, this
Rhombus can be useful to further refine the distinction between closely-related
acts, like “supposing”,“assuming”, “conceiving”, or “imagining”.
Even though we have chosen to treat them all as forms of a more gen-
eral notion of “imagination” in order to focus on the content of such mental
representations, and as we said at the beginning of this manuscript, some au-
thors distinguish those acts. Weinberg and Meskin (2006), or Balcerak-Jackson
(2016), for instance, argue that supposition is more commonly used during
hypothetical reasoning, whereas imagination is more commonly used when
engaging in fictions. We argue that, by being able to highlight the dynamic
mechanisms more commonly used in certain imagination acts, the Rhombus of
Imagination provides a clearer representation of intuitive differences between
those. By representing the procedural signature of imagination in, say, hypo-
thetical reasoning, the Rhombus captures what could be seen as the signature
of “supposition”, according to the previously cited works.
Furthermore, and as we point out on a footnote at the beginning of Section
4, the Rhombus could be extended to account for other mechanisms, such as
the involvement of actual mental imagery. In that case, the Rhombus could be
used to highlight how, according to certain authors, “imagining” does involve
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mental imagery, whereas “conceiving”, or “supposing”, do not. Even though
this falls outside the scope of the present work, we claim that the Rhombus
can be used to further refine and identify the differences between such acts in
a more concrete way.
Alternatively, and moving beyond the debate about whether and how dis-
tinct those acts are, the Rhombus offers an alternative approach towards classi-
fying acts of imagination. By paying attention not to the particular underlying
act, but rather to the context in which a certain imagination episode is car-
ried out, the Rhombus allows to distinguish and classify different “modes” of
imagining, according to their procedural structure. Under this view, acts of
imagination can be distinguished solely on their procedural signature, which
determines which, and how much, they typically use one or another mecha-
nism. Different kinds of imagination acts would be distinguished, under this
interpretation, not through different mental states, but rather through the
different contexts in which they are applied and their Rhombus signature.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
While reviewing certain theories of the dynamics of imagination in Section 2,
we have seen how, although they all share an underlying structure, they are
not detailed enough to be used as the underlying setting for a formal account of
how imaginary worlds are created and elaborated. In particular, the way they
define the reality-oriented development of imaginary scenarios embeds two
processes that should be distinguished. The reasons behind such distinction
are grounded both on the way actions had been previously represented in other
logical systems, as well as on the distinct uses those processes have in different
kinds of imagination acts. The Common Frame for Imagination Acts identifies
four different processes occurring in acts of imagination and characterizes how
they work in detail. We claim that those processes are better suited for a formal
and computational study of the dynamics of imagination acts, in particular
regarding how imaginary worlds are created and developed. We support our
claim by providing a sketch of how a commonly known thought experiment
could be formally represented using our framework.
Then, we define the Rhombus of Imagination as a visual tool specially
suited to represent different kinds of imagination acts according to their pro-
cedural structure, and we show how the Rhombus works in some examples.
Furthermore, we suggest how the Rhombus could be used to further under-
stand the similarities and differences of distinct uses of imagination. This could
either be done by focusing on the context in which imagination is applied, or by
looking at specific kinds of imagination acts, such as supposing, or conceiving,
to mention a few.
The Common Frame for Imagination Acts opens up the possibility of cap-
turing the dynamics of imagination acts using formal tools and computational
simulations. A natural next step, therefore, is to design and implement the
intuitions captured by the Common Frame into formal systems and further
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explore how our proposal can provide interesting insights to the study of imagi-
nation acts. Although we have sketched our proposal with a classical possible-
world setting in mind, considering a paraconsistent setting such as the one
used in Berto (2017), or Priest (2016), could lead to interesting and versatile
systems for imagination. Additionally, being able to capture such dynamics
in a computer-based simulation would be useful for the formal study of cer-
tain reasoning mechanisms that rely heavily on imaginary scenarios, such as
thought experiments.
Furthermore, and after seeing how the Rhombus of Imagination can indeed
be used as a valuable tool for identifying dynamic properties of imagination, we
want to perform a comprehensive analysis of the different kinds of imagination
acts that appear in the relevant literature in order to identify their procedural
differences. We believe that the analysis of their dynamics will provide valu-
able insights regarding how they work, and how distinct kinds of imagination
resemble and differ from other ones.
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